awards and the scope of liability of medical providers. After 1976, average claim frequency countrywide actually fell, but severity continued to outpace the rate of inflation. To what extent the downturn in frequency was the result of tort reforms remains an open question. However, other branches of tort law-notably product liability-have experienced trends in litigation similar to, if less extreme than, those in medical malpractice. This suggests that the determinants of malpractice litigation may lie beyond factors specific to medical care and malpractice law.
The purpose of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence on the contribution of these various factors to the diversity across states and changes over time in the frequency and severity of malpractice claims. Specifically, I attempt to measure the effect of medical and demographic characteristics, trends in litigation in other lines, and changes in common and statutory law, using data on claims closed in 1970 and 1975-78. To the extent variation in claims is due to variation in the frequency and type of medical treatments, tort reforms may be inappropriate and ineffective. On the other hand, if variation in claims is due primarily to variation in incentives created by the legal system, then tort reforms which reduce these incentives will reduce claim costs. The optimal design of such tort reforms in the context of the overall role of the liability system is a crucial issue beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief positive analysis of the determinants of the post-1975 tort reforms is presented.
The remainder of this introductory section compares countrywide trends in medical malpractice and other lines and presents some summary statistics on differences among states and trends over time in malpractice claims. Section II presents a simple model of the determinants of frequency and severity of claims. Section III describes the data and methods of estimation. Section IV reports the empirical analysis of frequency of claims per capita, severity per claim, and claim cost per capita. Section V analyzes the determinants of the post-1975 tort reforms. Section VI summarizes the findings. For all lines, severity has outpaced the general rate of inflation. Between 1971-78, the severity trend of 12.4 percent per annum for physicians and 18.9 percent for hospitals is comparable to the 19.4 percent and 12.1 percent for product liability bodily injury and physical damage, respectively, and 14.1 percent and 15.6 percent for automobile bodily injury and physical damage.4 4 The increase in average severity tends to overstate the increase in severity for a given injury, if the decline in frequency reflects an elimination of minor claims. The average lag from filing to disposition increased from eighteen months for malpractice claims closed in 1975 to twenty-five months for claims closed in 1978. This may reflect a reduction in the filing of minor claims, which close relatively quickly, and/or longer lags in disposition, possibly due to the uncertainty created by the changes in law. Between 1975 and 1978, the median rate of increase of severity is 30 percent, while the mean exceeds 60 percent, reflecting the impact of a few states with dramatic changes. This mean of the state means grew more rapidly than the countrywide mean, because the majority of small states grew more rapidly than the few states which account for most of the claims. Year-to-year changes are even more volatile for severity than for frequency, ranging from -90 percent to + 1,000 percent, reflecting the small number of claims in some states and the huge potential range of awards." As in the case of frequency, severity grew most rapidly in states where the initial level was low.
Medical Malpractice: Comparison across States
In general, the spread between the minimum and the twenty-fifth percentile is much smaller than the spread between the seventy-fifth percentile and the maximum, indicating highly skewed distributions, with a few states having much more adverse experience than the majority.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY
The relationships of major economic and policy interest-the deterrent effect of tort sanctions on quality of care and the determinants of incentives to file a claim-cannot be estimated directly because there are no Frequency of Claims. In order to establish a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must show that he sustained damages during the course of medical treatment; that the treatment violated the standard of due care; and that the injury was causally related to the negligent treatment. The frequency of claims filed therefore depends on the frequency of injury, the standard of care, and the incentives to file.
Exposure to iatrogenic injury (adverse outcomes related to medical care) in any period depends on the frequency of medical treatments, although a strictly proportional relationship is not expected, since the mix of treatments changes with the quantity. The actual frequency of injuries depends on the normal risk of the procedures performed and on the incentives of medical providers to practice with care, which incentives in turn depend on expected sanctions through the tort system, if negligent.9
Given the flow of injuries, the stock of potential claims at any point depends on the standard of care being applied by the courts and the statute of limitations. Although in general the standard of due care is defined by the customary practice of the profession, the courts have expanded the scope of liability of medical providers in recent years by rejecting traditional defenses and recognizing new grounds for action. For example, abolition of the locality rule substitutes a statewide or national standard for a local standard of acceptable practice; the abolition of charitable and government immunity has exposed voluntary and government hospitals to suit; the doctrine of respondeat superior extends the liability of hospitals for the actions of their employees; the doctrine of informed consent set new standards for disclosure of risk. Courts have also occasionally asserted the right to override medical custom and apply a costbenefit calculus to individual cases.10 9 The word "injuries" denotes all adverse medical outcomes, including those attributable to negligent care and those within the normal risk of acceptable care. A study of iatrogenic injuries in twenty-three California hospitals estimated that 17 percent were potentially actionable under the negligence system. California Medical Association and California Hospital Association, Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (1977 Changes in legal rules that reduce costs or increase the payoff to suit tend to increase the stock of potential claims. Changes which expand the scope of liability have a similar effect, to the extent the changes are applied retroactively. Incidents previously considered not worth filing or within normal risk become potentially actionable under the new standards. The increment to the stock of potential claims depends on the statute of limitations, which determines how many years of prior practice may be affected by current changes."
Incentives to file from the stock of potential claims depend on the expected payoff to filing, net of costs. The expected payoff is the product of the probability of winning, which depends on the standard of care applied by the courts, and the expected award, which depends on the damages incurred and the law defining compensation (see below). The costs of filing a claim are determined by the wage rate of attorneys, the opportunity cost of the plaintiffs time, and the expected (optimized) input of effort, which depends on the rules of procedure and evidence. Recent rule changes which have effectively reduced plaintiffs' litigation costs include abolition or modification of the locality rule;12 allowing medical texts as evidence of customary practice, and expansion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. In an attempt to contain this trend, since 1975 many states have reinstated some form of locality rule and limited the application of res ipsa. Other states have introduced arbitration or pretrial screening panels, which may lower costs and hence raise the net payoff to filing. 13 The frequency of claims closed in any year reflects the rate of filings in several prior years and the lag in disposition, which may exceed ten years but averages around two years.
Average Severity. The potential award per paid claim (potential se-" Even with static standards, the long-run equilibrium frequency of actionable injuries could be nonzero for several reasons. First, if physicians pay less than the full cost of negligent injuries, because some injured patients do not sue or because liability insurance premiums are not experience rated, then incentives are insufficient to eliminate all negligence. Very crude estimates suggest that at most one in ten potentially actionable injuries give rise to a claim. Second, if the courts set standards above the efficient level, it is cheaper for a physician to pay damages than to comply. Third, if standards are set at the efficient level for the average physician, it may be cheaper for the below average physician to pay damages than comply. The contribution of these factors to claim frequency cannot be tested with the data available.
12 If local physicians are unwilling to testify against each other-the alleged "conspiracy of silence"'-abolition of the locality rule reduces the cost to the plaintiff of obtaining expert testimony. 13 The net effect of these alternative forums is highly uncertain a priori, since they may change expected recoveries as well as verity) depends on the "true" damages incurred on claims closed with payment and the valuation of these damages by the courts. For nonfatal claims, "true" damages depend on the severity of the injury, the plaintiff's actual or potential wage level, and his life expectancy. Rules of compensable damages determine the valuation of these damages by the courts. The trend over time at common law has been to extend the categories of compensable damages from tangible "economic loss" (forgone wages and medical expense) to less tangible items, such as loss of consortium and pain and suffering. Since 1975, many states have modified basic tort damage rules for cases of medical malpractice by such measures as: dollar ceilings, either on the total award or on some component; modification of the collateral source rule, to admit evidence and, in some states, mandate offset of compensation from other sources against the tort recovery; elimination of the plaintiff's ad damnum (the dollar amount claimed as damages); and periodic payment of future damages.
The predicted effects of explanatory variables on potential awards do not carry over immediately to observed severity per paid claim. For example, let r denote the implicit value per unit of true damages defined by the legal rules governing compensation. Observed average severity per paid claim could rise or fall in response to an increase in r. This is because an increase in r not only raises actual awards on inframarginal claims but also raises the expected net payoff on all potential claims and therefore induces filing of claims with true damages or probability of winning too low to have been worth filing prior to the increase in r. Differences in average severity across states or changes over time understate differences in r to the extent the composition of the claim universe changes in response to a change in r. Observed severity therefore depends on the fraction of claims filed from the potential stock.
Changes in Law. In principle, both common and statutory law are endogenous. They are influenced by some of the same demographic characteristics that affect the frequency and severity of claims, and by the frequency and severity of claims themselves. Only the post-1975 tort reforms are explicitly modeled here. Standard public choice theory predicts that tort reforms would be more comprehensive and/or passed earlier in states which experienced a high level or rate of increase of insurance premiums, in which the medical profession and insurance industry were relatively powerful and the legal profession relatively weak. This is discussed in more detail below.
Structural Model
The analysis of the previous section may be described formally by a (1)
The stock of potential claims in year t is a function of the injury rate in prior years for which the statute of limitations (S) has not yet run, and the standards applied by the courts (Lt):
i=t The frequency of claims filed from the stock of potential claims depends on the expected net payoff, which is determined by legal rules (which affect the probability and cost of proving negligence and define compensable damages), the cost of legal services, and demographic factors which affect true damages and plaintiff time costs:
Frequency of claims closed in year t, F,, is some fraction, 8, of claims filed in several prior years, depending on delays in disposition: Total claim cost per capita is simply the product of frequency and severity and therefore depends on the same variables:
The propensity to enact tort reforms early and/or be more restrictive of plaintiff interests depends on frequency and severity of claims in 1975, the level of malpractice insurance premiums, and on medical, legal, and demographic characteristics:15 L75 = L(F75, A75, P75, Y75, Z75, X75).
(7)
'4 Strictly, the 8, should be treated as endogenous, but the data available do not permit identification. Year subscripts are dropped where the value of a variable over several years is relevant. 15 The 1974 20 Estimation from first differences was unsuccessful, possibly because there is little variation in some of the independent variables over the short span of years in the sample, and because the autoregressive process is complex. 21 The pattern is not sufficiently stable to justify imposing a structure on the covariance matrix. 22 Coefficients in the (log) total claim cost equation are not expected to be precisely the sum of coefficients in the frequency and severity equations because the logit rather than the log transformation of frequency is used and because different weights were used for the frequency and severity equations. 23 The estimation techniques presuppose that the residuals are normally distributed. Normality of the dependent variable is a rough guide to the normality of the residuals.
24 Because claims are measured per 100,000 population, the logit formulation is only approximately correct. Since claims per 100,000 is near zero, the error is very small. 25 Since four years of data are pooled but sample size is relatively constant across years for each state, the weight used is the average of the four individual year weights.
26 Let nit be the population of state i in year t, and for k = 1, ..., nit, let Y,, be a binary random variable representing the closing of a claim by the kth person, which takes the value of one with probability, 27 Constraining coefficients to be equal across years effectively quadruples sample size so increases estimation efficiency if the coefficients are equal in all years. In the reduced-form equations of Table 3 , coefficients are theoretically not equal for variables which affect claims both directly and indirectly through their effect on tort reforms. However, using an F-test, the hypothesis of equal coefficients could not be rejected. Whether or not particular medical procedures generate disproportionately high claim frequencies is of some policy interest. Unequal probability of suit if negligent distorts the expected cost to physicians of different procedures and hence may distort medical choices and the quality of care. However, separate effects of quantity and complexity or mix of medical treatments could not be identified. Controlling for physician density, explanatory power was not increased by adding full-time equivalent hospital staff per patient day (a measure of labor intensity or quality) or the ratio of hospital cost per day to the average manufacturing wage (a measure of capital intensity). The effect of number of surgeons per capita was not statistically different from the effect of nonsurgical specialists. This evidence casts doubt on Mueller's conclusion that complex hospital facilities generate more claims, and Feldman's that surgery rates are a significant determinant of claims.28 Neither study controlled for quantity of medical treatments. This is likely to bias upward the estimated effect of the particular type of treatment measured, since quantity and complexity are highly correlated.29 Mueller's results are also influenced by the use of population weights, which yields estimates dominated by the few most populous states (see Appendix B).
Claim frequency is unrelated to the percentage of the population over sixty-five. Since hospital admission rates of the elderly are roughly twice as high as for persons under sixty-five and the rate of negligent injury per admission is roughly twice as high for the elderly, the absence of any significant difference in claim frequency implies that the probability of filing a claim, given a potentially actionable injury, is roughly one-fourth that of persons under sixty-five, presumably because of lower compensable damages.30 This evidence suggests the more general conclusion, that claims with small stakes are deterred from filing by the fixed costs of litigation.3' If so, the tort system will underdeter minor carelessness. Per capita income has no significant effect on frequency or severity, after controlling for physician and lawyer densities. This suggests that the high simple correlations between income and both frequency and severity are attributable to the medical and legal characteristics associated with high income. Income apparently has little effect on the net expected payoff and propensity to sue, possibly because the positive effect of higher compensable damages is offset by the negative effect of high time costs.
A measure of urbanization was included without any specific theoretical justification, although it can be rationalized as a catch-all for such factors as easier access to litigation, greater willingness to sue because of depersonalized physician-patient relationships, and so forth. Controlling for physician density, urbanization is the most significant and, in terms of elasticities, the most powerful predictor of frequency. The elasticity of frequency with respect to the percentage of the state urbanized is .86. In part this may reflect a supply response to the higher verdicts awarded by urban courts: the elasticity of severity with respect to percentage of state urbanized is .80. This understates the difference in compensation per unit of loss (r) if an increase in r induces the filing of more marginal claims which pulls down observed average severity. Attempts to identify further the characteristics of urban environments that influence claim frequency and severity were unsuccessful. The urban coefficient is essentially unaffected by including number of lawyers and specific laws. Other variables that proved insignificant and were therefore dropped include: the percentage of the population on welfare, the unemployment rate, and court delay.32
As a measure of the deterrent effect of tort sanctions on physicians' behavior, I tried including the level and rate of increase of malpractice insurance premiums. If such deterrence exists, these variables do not capture it.33
Price of Legal Services
The number of lawyers per capita was included as a proxy for the cost of legal services. But the finding, that lawyer density has no effect on claim frequency after controlling for physician density and urbanization and is positively related to claim severity, suggests that high lawyer den-32 Average time from service of answer to trial in personal injury litigation in federal courts in the major urban areas of the state. Source: Institute for Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study (1970, 1972, 1974) . 33 The signs were always positive, possibly because any negative deterrent effect was dominated by the reverse, positive effective of frequency on premiums. However, there was also no evidence of a deterrent effect of premiums on the rate of change of claim frequency. sity does not in fact indicate low cost of legal services.34 A decline in the cost of legal services is expected to increase the frequency of suits but not necessarily affect severity since optimum legal effort for both plaintiff and defense increases, with offsetting effects on severity. A plausible explanation for the findings is that high lawyer density reflects high demand for legal services and therefore does not imply low cost.35 Even the low estimated elasticity of severity with respect to number of lawyers (.12) overestimates any net effect of lawyer density on severity, because of endogeneity bias.
At the time of the malpractice crisis, the surge of malpractice litigation was widely blamed on lawyers displaced from automobile litigation by the passage of no-fault laws.36 This argument would be sound only if the number of displaced lawyers was sufficiently large to depress the supply price of legal services on malpractice cases. It is unpersuasive a priori because most of the automobile tort thresholds were set so low as to constitute little bar to litigation, and it tends to be refuted by the evidence. The constrained estimates show a positive effect of no-fault on malpractice severity but a negative effect on claim frequency, whereas the predicted effects are positive for frequency, and ambiguous for severity, if no-fault did indeed depress attorney wage rates. Even if the coefficients are taken at face value, they imply minimal effects: states that adopted no-fault had an 11 percent higher claim severity, a 13 percent lower claim frequency, with no significant net effect on total claim cost per capita.
If professional associations can raise wage rates by restricting competition, then the percentage of attorneys who are members of the American Bar Association (ABA) should be positively related to attorney wage rates. Contrary to the implications of this hypothesis, claim frequency is unrelated to ABA membership and claim severity is lower in states where ABA membership is high. Thus none of these variables yields a plausible estimate of the supply response of claims to the cost of legal services.
Pre-1975 Laws
Specific laws were added last to test whether they merely reflect demographic factors or whether they have additional explanatory power.37 The estimates imply that the four pro-plaintiff common-law doctrines included in the compound variable, 1970 LAWS (abolition of the locality rule and of charitable immunity, admission of informed consent, and respondeat superior) contributed significantly to claim frequency through the mid1970s. On average over the period 1975-78, states which recognized all four doctrines by 1970 had 53 percent higher claim frequency per capita, 28 percent higher severity, and 86 percent higher total claim cost per capita than states which recognized none. Of the four doctrines, informed consent had the greatest impact.
The effects of these laws on severity are positive but not statistically significant, which on theoretical grounds is not surprising. By expanding the scope of liability, informed consent, abolition of charitable immunity, and application of respondeat superior will induce the filing of claims which would not otherwise have been filed. The mean true damages of claims filed may rise or fall. The possibility of naming hospitals as codefendants on claims against physicians will tend to raise potential awards by raising defense costs.38 Abolition of the locality rule expands liability and reduces the cost of establishing liability, so it may raise the plantiff's optimum legal effort, hence raising potential awards on all claims but inducing more marginal claims, with an ambiguous net effect on observed severity.
These estimates probably overstate the net causal effect on claims of these specific laws because of correlation with other unmeasured differences in legal doctrine and endogeneity bias; that is, these doctrines may have been adopted in states which, for other reasons, had a relatively high claim frequency. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the laws had a net positive effect is supported by the pattern of the coefficients over time, and their significance after controlling for variables which might be included as predictors in a full simultaneous model. Table 5 , which reports individual year coefficients, shows that the effects peaked in 1976 and declined thereafter. Claims closed in later years would include an increasing number filed after 1970, for which 1970 LAWS is an inaccurate measure of applicable law, since the doctrines became more widespread during the 1970s. 37 The choice of which variables to consider predetermined is to some extent arbitrary. 38 Danzon & Lillard, supra note 31.
To test whether trends in malpractice litigation merely mirror trends in litigation in general, measures of the frequency and severity of claims for two other lines-owners', landlords', and tenants' (OLT) and manufacturers' and contractors' liability-were included.39 The correlations were surprisingly low, and only the most significant, OLT severity, is included here. It is positively related to malpractice severity and average claim cost per capita, negatively related to malpractice claim frequency. The negative relation between claim frequency and OLT is consistent with a negative correlation between observed severity and r, because a high r induces marginal claims. The size and cohesiveness of the medical profession apparently had little impact on the total number/early enactment of tort reforms. The early passage of a limit on contingent fees was more likely in states with high physician density and a large proportion of physicians belonging to a local medical society, but these effects are not highly significant. The number of lawyers has the expected effect: high density of lawyers per capita tends to reduce the number of reforms enacted and, in particular, to reduce the probability of a limit on contingent fees.
The expected sign of the share of the insurance market written by the largest carrier is ambiguous a priori: high concentration implies few firms but a larger stake per firm and lower organization costs. In fact, the number of laws passed is significantly negatively related to the dominant firm's market share, which suggests that the number of insurers with a stake in the market contributed to the number and promptness of tort reform. But if this interpretation is correct, the absence of any significant effect on the statute of limitations is surprising, since a long statute of limitations is a major source of risk to insurers.
Urbanized states tended to adopt more numerous and early reforms, reduce their statutes of limitations by a greater amount, and adopt absolutely shorter statutes. States with relatively pro-plaintiff common law made more numerous/early changes in statutory law, including limits on contingent fees. Since these tort reforms tend to restrict plaintiff rights, this suggests significant differences in the relative power of the various interest groups in influencing common and statutory law.
All of the measures of the extent of crisis-level and proposed increase in insurance premiums, frequency or severity of claims-appear to have had only a weak effect on the extent of tort reform. Of the various measures tried, the proposed premium increase in 1975 has the greatest explanatory power. This is not surprising. In the long run, high premiums can be passed through in higher fees for medical services, but in the short run fees are sticky due to reimbursement practices of third-party payers. Thus a large sudden premium increase imposes greater costs on physicians than an equivalent, more gradual total increase.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Although trends in malpractice litigation have paralleled trends in other lines, this analysis of the contribution of medical, demographic, and legal factors to malpractice litigation indicates that factors specific to medical care and malpractice law have significant explanatory power. The growth in medical services since the mid-1960s has contributed to, but certainly does not fully account for, the increase in claims and persistent diversity among states. In the absence of good measures for expected compensation per unit damages (r) or the cost of legal services, I have been unable to estimate explicit supply elasticities of claims in response to changes in these variables. The supply of lawyers does not appear to have a significant independent effect.
The strong effect on claim frequency of pro-plaintiff common-law doctrines implies that laws do make a difference and are not merely a reflection of more fundamental, underlying forces. This conclusion is reinforced by the evidence that post-1975 tort reforms designed to reduce awards-in particular, dollar caps and mandatory offset of compensation from collateral sources-have significantly reduced severity. However, these estimates of the effect of the post-1975 tort reforms must be viewed as rough measures of their short-run impact.
Two important questions remain unanswered. The first is to identify the characteristics of urban environments which generate higher claim frequency and severity. Urbanization is the single most powerful predictor of both frequency and severity, even after controlling for higher physician and lawyer density in urban states, more pro-plaintiff common law and the frequency and severity of claims in other liability lines. Higher awards by urban courts are probably one factor inducing the higher claim frequency. Other factors which were tried but do not account for urban litigiousness include more complex medical facilities, per capita income, welfare and unemployment rates.
The second unexplained puzzle is the post-1975 decline in claim frequency. It can apparently not be attributed to the tort reforms-which does not mean that these reforms will not reduce frequency in the longer run. The decline in frequency can apparently also not be attributed to the deterrent power of tort sanctions, at least as measured by malpractice insurance premiums. It is possible that the post-1975 decline in frequency was a temporary lull due to a transitory attitude associated with the 1975 crisis. It is also possible that the preceding peak was the aberration, reflecting the backlog of potential claims which became worth filing as a result of the pro-plaintiff shift in common law in the sixties, combined with long statutes of limitations. The postcrisis reduction in statutes of limitations should have reduced the destabilizing potential, should another such pro-plaintiff shift in doctrine occur. Until a longer time series of claim data is available, this hypothesis remains untested speculation. 
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